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Edmund Husserl’s treatment of signs as derivative from the lived presence
of human consciousness1 has evoked quite divergent critical comments. Two
can paradigmatically be singled out. Whereas Jaques Derrida in a Heideg-
gerian move shows the metaphysical assumptions hidden in unmediated pres-
ence,2 Ernst Tugendhat exchanges Husserl’s emphasis on phenomenological ex-
plorations of the human mind for the tools of analytical philosophy of language3.
Although Derrida and Tugendhat eventually move into very different directions
their objections start from similar concerns. Talk about signs is almost incom-
prehensible unless a certain dualism between something that is employed to
indicate, refer to, mean . . . something else is assumed. It can be argued that,
consequently, Husserl’s attempt to tie such a dichotomy back to the presumably
unshrouded clarity of Cartesian consciousness threatens the very idea of signi-
fication. According to this consideration semantics cannot be grounded in the
noetic realm. ,,Signs are foreign to this self-presence of consciousness” (SP, 58)
since their possibility rests on some systematically antecedent set of differences
governing the relations between what is present (the signifier) and what is in-
dicated or expressed by it (the signified). This idea can be expressed not only
in the Saussurian terms the early Derrida draws upon, but also by using the
distinction between syntax and semantics familiar in analytical philosophy.
The consequent complexity of a sign calls for a careful description of its
constitutive elements as well as of the overarching structure that keeps those
elements from disintegrating into mere givens, lacking significative value. In
outlining these relationships I shall link the terminology of formal semantics
to considerations that are closer to the European tradition. The outcome will
justify Derrida’s observation about ,,the sign (being) from its origin . . . marked
by this will to derivation or effacement.” (SP, 51) Derrida’s insight (which coin-
cides with analytic philosophy’s insistence on mediation by language) raises the
question of how to deal with the permanent unfulfillment such a status inflicts
1Edmund Husserl Logical Investigations v. II. Cf. Investigation 1, sections 5-15 and
Investigation 5, section 19
2Jacques Derrida Speech and Phenomena And Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs
Evanston 1973. Henceforth cited as SP.
3Traditional and Analytical Philosophy: Lectures on the Philosophy of Language. Cam-
bridge 1982.
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upon a sign. Husserl’s concern with the fulfillment of intentional (semantical)
phenomena, however, also deserves to be taken seriously. I will, therefore, de-
velop an account of i,,the sign” that retains its metaphysical non-primordiality
while accommodating the fact that in describing its successful employment we
constantly find ourselves referred back to just the language of originary insight
attacked by Derrida. Introducing an illustrative simile and relating its discus-
sion to the traditional distinction between first and second nature I hope to show
how the autonomy of intentional and semantical notions can be upheld even as
attempts to ground them in some basic intuition or successful employment are
conceived as perfectly legitimate. It will become clear in the course of the argu-
ment that only by abandoning the rhetoric of exclusiveness can a satisfactory
account of the sign be given. In general terms: signs are characteristic examples
of transient satisfaction. The fundamental constituents of any semantic the-
ory have to be able to fit smoothly into a pattern of originary relations while
preserving the susceptibility to disruption that marks their non-primordiality.
1 Formal Semantics
It can be doubted whether the idea of formal semantics arising from Gottlob
Frege’s work makes any sense at all. Meaning, as it is ordinarily understood,
is clearly distinct from abstract representations of meaningful utterances. To
clarify some basic points these constructions may, however, serve as a useful
starting point. What is a sign? We already characterized it as something
pointing to, or standing for, or representing, something else in an orderly fashion.
It seems natural to assume that such relations can be described systematically.
,,Model theory” is a completely abstract way of doing this, building up an
increasingly complex structure starting with interpretations of signs that are not
considered to be complex (elementary things) and moving on to configurations
of signs, presenting configurations of things in a formally suitable way.4 It is
not necessary to go into the details of this approach in order to discuss several
presuppositions exhibited by this approach. Let me explain some implications
of the underlying picture.
Perhaps the most fundamental assumption is this: something serving as a
sign is not regarded simply by itself, as an element of syntax. It is incorpo-
rated into a semantical relation that can be understood as directing attention
away from the given inscription, drawing it to something else, its semantical
value. Such values (entities, relations, truth) are readily defined in formal se-
mantics and as a consequence little emphasis is normally put on the fact that
they are constructs of a special kind, not on the same level with syntactic
marks. Nevertheless it is commonly conceded that a qualitative jump separates
concatenations of inscriptions from the ,,meanings” they represent ,,under an
interpretation.” Theoretical ideality marks the realm of the signified in any
semantical theory worth its name.
4Probably the best introductory account is to be found in G.E.Hughes and M.J.Cresswell
An Introduction to Modal Logic London 1968.
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Now, if we follow our intuition that words have meaning we seem committed
to an explanation of where they get it from. There is considerable theoretical
disagreement about how to proceed at this point, but one fundamental move
cannot be in dispute, since it establishes the semantical enterprise itself, namely
starting from a split, introducing two different kinds of entities before proceed-
ing to interrelate them systematically. Formally speaking, variables, constants
and terms refer to something; well formed formulae are satisfied by sets, and
sentences characterize models. This structural pattern should not distract atten-
tion away from the fact that a certain tension between presence (of the signifier)
and absence (of the signified) lies at the heart of this analytical account. Can
such a gap be allowed to stand at the beginning of a discipline? Mustn’t it be
retracted immediately because it would be impossible to explain the interrela-
tion of the components of the scheme? Consider formal languages designed to
refer to mathematical structures that are supposed to have a certain existence
of their own. On the one hand, they are conceptually separated from their ref-
erence, on the other hand, exactly the same language of set theory is used to
introduce the elements of both the system of signification and of the signified.
It is in fact by assuming a common logical structure that the split is made to
work as an inducement to bridging the gap. This can be generalized.
A sign enacts an essential distinction of realms, but it cannot function with-
out the possibility of their fusion either. If semantics does not simply occupy
itself with empirical investigations it has to reflect on this apparent contradic-
tion. The essentials of this situation are a double perspective and a unifying
overview, the relata of the procedure of interpretation on the one hand and its
underlying logic on the other. In model theory the interchange between pres-
ence and absence that constitutes a signifying unit is couched in prescriptive
mathematical meta-language. Thus the difficulty of having to explain how two
domains, per definition separate, can function as a whole is avoided. From this
perspective they are not at all unrelated to each other, since they form part
of a more inclusive pattern, held together by the rigor of a formal discipline.
But this explanation obviously fails when metaphysical, epistemological and
deconstructionist questions are raised.
2 The use of signs
The most prominent objection against formal semantics is that it rests on an
uncritical reification of meaning. As long as a distinction between making noise
and making sense is upheld, however, some account of the gap opened up by
the deferement accomplished by signs has to be given. A great variety of the-
ories, reaching from cognitive science to hermeneutics, is currently offered to
deal with the division and fusion of syntactic and semantic modes of analysis.
From information-processing to (post)metaphysical thinking, the characteristics
of signs have received wide attention. But there has also been a counter-current,
which, starting with Husserl’s attempts to ground signification in some promi-
nent features of human consciousness, tries to set aside such an uncomfort-
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able dualism. Ordinary reconstructions of our intuitions about meaning seem
to produce a very peculiar relation, bridging two incommensurable realms. In
Wittgenstein’s words: ,,Naming appears as a strange connection between a word
and an object.”5 Whatever the results of an empirical investigation into our cog-
nitive capacities might be and however impressive a case could be made for (or
against) our civilization’s tendency to reify meanings, according to Wittgenstein
such a strategy does not address itself to the most elementary question that can
be asked concerning a sign, namely why it needs some explanation at all. Why
should there be such a puzzling dichotomy calling for mysterious integrative
elements in the first place? To quote him again: ,,,The sentence, a peculiar
thing!’: the sublimation of the whole presentation resides in this. The tendency
to assume a pure intermediate being between the sentence-sign and the facts.”6
According to the picture of linguistic elements that depicts them as linked up
to corresponding elements of the world by a special, epistemologically relevant
relation, signs appear as extraordinary constituents of the universe. But once
one starts to wonder about signifying entities, there will be constant puzzlement
about the unity of the world and man’s position within and/or outside the course
it takes. This reconstruction of our use of language establishes a fundamental
ontological priority of speakers, i.e., beings that are somehow able to create the
world of which they are part. This is the predicament non-semantical theories of
understanding try to escape from. Wittgenstein, for example, in his later work
worries about the legitimacy of the initial astonishment and considers substan-
tialized meanings as consequences of a misguided picture of language. There are
no signs to start with, rather contexts of use that serve as complex, multilay-
ered units of communication. Furthermore a basis of unquestioned agreement
in behavior has to be assumed before bits of language relating to pieces of the
world can even be considered.
Jaques Derrida, as I have indicated, arrives at similar conclusions start-
ing from a critique of Husserl’s phenomenology.7 But his line of argument is
completely different. Realizing that the phenomenological concept of a sign is
firmly linked to traditional metaphysical assumptions, he tries to find a way
out of the dilemma of this foundationalism. In Derrida’s view signs cannot but
disturb metaphysical securities by their non-primordiality. His philosophical
strategy of thinking at the edge of metaphysics, consequently, unlike Wittgen-
stein’s anti-metaphysical thinking, demands a more complicated procedure. His
efforts divide into establishing a proto-primordial grounding of signification and
an overcoming of the established concept of a sign. The claim is that ,,to re-
store the original and nonderivative character of signs, in opposition to classical
metaphysics, is, by an apparent paradox, at the same time to eliminate a con-
cept of signs whose whole history and meaning belong to the adventure of the
metaphysics of presence.” (SP, 51)
Where does that leave us regarding the initial astonishment indicated by
5Philosophical Investigations,38
6Philosophical Investigations, 94
7Newton Garver’s Preface to Speech and Phenomena is helpful in connecting Derridas
incipient Deconstruction with Analytical Philosophy.
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Wittgenstein? Derrida occupies a peculiar position between semantic dualism
and its systematic opposite, the dissolution of ordinary signification within the
context of the living presence of consciousness or actual use of language. He hints
at an ultra-foundational attitude toward the sign, although he recognizes that
we would lose our current concept of a sign if we were successful in establishing
its proper nature. Something like a primordial diffe´rance is supposed to ground
signs and cannot be understood in established semantical terms. As it unfolds
it cancels the ,,metaphysics of the presence” on which, according to Derrida,
the common notion of signification rests. At this systematic juncture analytic
philosophy and deconstruction obviously part company in their attempts to
clarify the structure of semantics. So where does that leave my argument?
Schematically speaking, the preceding considerations have been drawn in two
different directions. On the one hand there is the discovery of a constitutive
dualism inherent in every attempt to conceptualize signification, on the other
hand there is insistence on a fundamental simplicity of human communication.
Very different schools, ranging from transcendental phenomenology to ordinary
language analysis regard this unity as anterior to a subsequent split. In taking
up the discussion at this point the next section will deal with a traditional
concept that receives scant treatment in Derrida’s critique of Husserlian self-
givenness of consciousness, namely intentionality. This concept will eventually
supply us with a pattern underlying the strangeness of the semantic relation
and the intuitive ease of signifying behavior.
3 How can signs fulfill their functions?
Intentionality can be established as a fundamental semantical relation or re-
garded with suspicion as resulting from an inherently dualistic world-view. The
activities of reference, belief, desire and the like are characteristically described
as of another kind as what is referred to, believed or desired. This difference
poses a constant challenge to philosophical attempts to eliminate the classical
epistemological dichotomy. Taking a closer look at so-called intentional phe-
nomena, however, reveals that neither undisturbed belief in their existence, nor
unrelenting attempts to remove them from the picture altogether are satisfac-
tory. Commonsense examples of fulfillment, such as discovering a solution to a
problem or keeping a promise give a good starting point for showing this.
Two types of situations are relevant in such cases, one marked by an un-
certainty, a question, generally speaking by an unresolved tension between con-
stituents of a certain state, the other one suggested by an overcoming of uncer-
tainty, e.g., the determination of an answer or the achievement of satisfaction
when a promise is kept. What one finds is a dichotomy that calls for resolution
into a state of satisfaction. But how can the question (the expectation, the
promise) be present in its fulfillment? These conditions of fit by definition ex-
clude just the unfulfilled features. An answer, once articulated, does not exhibit
the question it is an answer to. To solve this problem it is important to realize,
by looking at examples like the ones given, how artificially both our previous po-
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sitions have been opposed. Utterances are neither simply isolated (and in need
of interpretation), nor simply functioning in a satisfying way. We use them in
particular circumstances in order to fulfill certain needs. It is loosely said that
something answers a question. A more precise way of putting this would be
to say that within a certain context something is accepted by someone as an
answer. There is a peculiar logic at work here. By relating an unresolved situa-
tion to a state of comparative closure an extremely useful move of mastering the
world is described. This bears on the process of signification and its fulfillment
in unproblematic use.
Achieving satisfaction is not adequately described as making one final move
toward an aim. It involves a qualitative change in the description of the whole
enterprise. Here we can begin to see why fulfillment of intentional attitudes
might (precariously) hold semantics together. In some sense, ordinary meaning-
ful behavior must be described by excluding reference to possible disturbances.
Nevertheless the complexity of the overall situation can only be captured if the
second descriptive approach, pointing at the lack of fit, is included. Fulfillment
cannot be conceptualized as a result only, it has to be seen as fulfillment of some-
thing and by this very feature relates back to the state of unfulfillment. In pro-
ceeding from an explicitly objectified semantical situation toward its resolution
the problematic dichotomy can be eliminated but the resulting one-dimensional
account of successful communication loses its punch if it is divorced from this
genesis. Pure satisfaction is a phantom.
Fulfillment of intentional structures, seen in this way, is a concept referring
to both a process of satisfaction and its result, weaving together situations char-
acterized by a lack of fulfillment and by the lack of this lack. It is crucial that
when some want changes into accomplishment the whole apparatus employed
to describe the respective situations is completely reshuﬄed, provoking claims
of radical incommensurability. As long as signifiers can be viewed in isolation
their correlates in the realm of sense are also bound to appear as single entities,
causing the problem of commerce between signifier and signified. Lack of satis-
faction produces the construct of something capable of satisfying this state. But
it is exactly because of this that the constructed entity cannot fulfill its task of
satisfaction as if it were a missing piece of equipment fitting into a predesigned
slot. Its raison d’etre is to indicate the incompleteness of the situation by its
absence, it cannot simply be added to it like another of its elements.
Thus fulfillment, seen as a process, relates two qualitatively different types
of situations. Obviously, introducing a one-to-one correlation between its re-
spective constituents will not work here. This is why the apparatus of formal
semantics is of no use in clarifying the situation. Establishing a metaphysical
link between the signified and the signifier likewise is a misguided way of grasp-
ing what happens when the patterns of description switch. Thus Derrida is right
against Husserl insofar as he stresses the uneliminable strangeness within this
relation. But he misses Husserl’s legitimate concern with intuitive closure. Talk
about satisfaction amounts to a decision to see those patterns in the light of
each other and more precisely to regard a lack of disruption as a state internally
connected with a particular disruption and its removal. Only by resorting to
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the analysis of a preceding problem and the logical space it opens up can some
features of a state of the world be recognized as solutions. Taken by themselves
they remain mute, just as a question without the prospect of an answer is mere
rhetoric. Various philosophers have attacked the inclination to be inside and
outside of a particular language-game at the same time. Such tendencies can
certainly be a source of confusion, but, if my remarks on fulfillment are correct,
we cannot dismiss them out of hand. The course of investigation suggesting
itself here, rather, is to find out more about this simultaneity.
4 First Nature, Second Nature
Let me explore the tension between abstraction and involvement, starting with
an example of harmless dualism. Someone owns a very old record player and has
never heard of anything more refined than mono recordings, even though half
his records are produced for stereo listening. He has to be taught the difference
between mono and stereo, and only by being shown how a stereo system works
will he be able to discover that his own collection consists of two significantly
different types of records. In other words, only the proper use of a particular
apparatus can bring out experiential distinctions. It is virtually meaningless to
claim that they are present per se, without the availability of a certain corpus of
knowledge and techniques. We can construct certain machines that enable us to
subdivide one type of sound-event into two sub-types, depending on the informa-
tion upon which the record-player operates. The content of such an acoustical
event, consequently, is relative to the interests and devices of those trying to
extract the information from a given source. Everyday life characteristically
consists in such multi-layered situations. A wealth of data is ordinarily invested
into the constitution of objects of our acquaintance but there is no ultimate test
that could ascertain how many levels of analysis there are and no guarantees
that newly found features will fit together nicely with the ones already known.
Signs figure within this same experience. They cannot simply be picked out as
self-sufficient elements of the world (if there are any) just like stereo records are
not recognizable without a special differentiating device. Earlier on I described
the semantical stance as imposition of a duality of views on given data. This
is nicely mirrored in my propaedeutic simile, stereo sound splitting the flow of
impulses from the original source and processing it through a second channel.
The lesson suggested by this example is as follows. A sign is something
that can be seen as just another piece of nature and, with the help of certain
conceptual devices, as embodiment of some particular transcendence of sup-
posedly ,,natural” interactions – namely lawlike causal processes or pragmatic
communicative discourse. To see this more clearly, let us look again at the
case of the record-player. A crucial distinction has to be observed here. Stereo
can be opposed to mono but both stereo and mono are modes of reproduction
of some previously given acoustical signal. The original sound underlying the
record obviously is neither mono nor stereo. In reproducing it we use a given
set of possibilities that implies and/or excludes others, all of them, however,
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remaining on this side of the representational divide. Stereo might invariably
sound ,,better” to the well-informed listener but this does not affect the point
that there are distinct uses for either of both reproductive modes. (This is why
more sophisticated audio-equipment usually includes a mono-button.) Both
recording-techniques are, in a systematic sense, equi-distant from the original
source. This does not entail, however, that their difference in reproductive qual-
ity cannot be put to use according to changing requirements. Now it seems to
me that naturalistic and semantical descriptions of human behavior can also be
regarded along those lines. Taken as descriptions both share the same method-
ological status, neither being an a priori more accurate rendering of a certain
phenomenon than the other. Only by specifying the circumstances we set up
a situation in which either mode of description is superior. Sound events are
neither inherently mono nor stereo but there can be an overwhelming case for
preferring stereo reproduction against mono. Employment of the dualism in-
herent in intentional ascription can likewise be the best strategy available to
make sense of the data. Claiming that semantical features of the world must be
derivable from causal or pragmatic ones can then be compared to saying that
stereo sound derives from basically mono acoustical sources.
Let us discuss this less picturesquely in the setting of our considerations
about fulfillment as resolution of the semantical dichotomy. The general point
is that there is not one exclusive way to describe how signs actually function.
Simply substituting the semantical scheme in favor of a non-dualistic one, the
other one – or else remaining within the dichotomy, crossing from explicit to
implicit intentionality, both are easy ways out. This leaves us with the task
of specifying the particular way in which fulfillment as non-dichotomic state of
affairs is affected by intentionality. As it turns out it can be posited on either
side of the semantic tension. Talk about an unmediated fit between significa-
tory elements can be taken either as naturalistic or as a very special semantical
description. One pertinent way of expressing the distinction is to say that opera-
tional signs are often regarded as ,,first” nature whereas their particularity only
shows under the light of what has traditionally been called ,,second nature”,
a combination of features of naturalistic interaction and fulfillment of mean-
ing. Second nature is the quasi-causal set of historically acquired dispositions
posited, among other reasons, to capture the law-like quality of sign-governed
behavior. Social compliance with signs is not present in conceptualizations of
nature pure and simple. Second nature seems supervenient on nature in the
literal sense and thus is open to well-known reductionist complaints. Is it just
an invention useful to lay claim to a specially invented, dubious territory of
humanistic fancy?
Why should we employ representational categories when meaningful behav-
ior seems to lack explicit intentional features most of the time? Its characteris-
tics can, on the contrary, often be convincingly described within the mechanical
paradigm. Why take the trouble of introducing second nature? The answer
turns on the degree of complexity and interference of simultaneous, mutually
exclusive, perspectives one is prepared to countenace. The concept serves to
introduce an additional coherence into the constitution of hermeneutical phe-
8
nomena, namely the historical dimension of communicating, failing to commu-
nicate, and reopening communication by means of signs. To explain how it
is possible that something disclosed to us in an intentional mode and seen as
fulfillment of – hence elimination of – this very mode is the same thing, we
must be able to come up with a story connecting sentences in the intentional
idiom with standard assertions from which reference to intentional states has
been dropped. It calls for an elucidation using different approaches much more
flexible than their contraposition suggests. Assimilating second to first nature,
on the other hand, amounts to opting against the delicate conceptual balance
that allows us to treat fulfillment of the semantical quest as something distinct
from a pre-semantical ,,fullness” of interactions. The question comes to whether
semantics has its own distinctive foundation or whether it is forced to search
for it within the confines of another paradigm. It follows that, if the former
is conceded, the relation of first to second nature has to remain an open ques-
tion. Attempts to address it have to include provisions not only for the stability
but also for the possible disruption of the signifying process. Lack of the first
requirement disqualifies something as adequate description, lack of the second
falls short of characterizing signs at least if they are understood as figuring in
two distinct sets of circumstances capable of being integrated into unproblem-
atic procedures, and yet readable as contingent resolutions of previously open
configurations.
5 Multiple Simultaneous Descriptions
Starting from the controversy about Husserl’s anchoring signs in the primor-
dial realm of Cartesian consciousness, the preceding discussion has advanced to
show how intuitions concerning their ultimate deriveability and ultimate under-
iveability may be reconciled. In its course we have touched upon three possible
foundational accounts: naturalism, autonomy of dualism and a kind of natu-
ralism on the second level, embedded in use. Those alternatives are commonly
regarded as mutually exclusive, competing approaches. But adherence to just
one of those frames misses the essential complexity of the phenomenon we have
been investigating. Such a story has to be built on the interplay between the
various modes of reference. It would lose its points if only one would be allowed.
As a typical example take the situation one finds oneself in when trying to
reduce the intrinsic dualism of representation to some unmediated connective
state of the world. There are, as I have pointed out, in principle two ways to
go: first and second nature, both removing the challenge of dualism, though by
very different means. The choice is between abolishing the category of inten-
tionality or tracing its fulfillment. But why should one suppose that the same
choice is adequate on all occasions? Cries of pain and utterances communicat-
ing intellectual achievements require different treatment. There are situations
calling for the abandonment of dualistic complications and others that need to
be considered in the light of the difficulties they induce. Wittgenstein’s puzzle-
ment about the ,,strangeness” of the naming relation is probably best put to
9
rest by focussing on the fact that we ordinarily suceed in referring. But this
does not exclude the possibility that we find ourselves stuck with the problem
of reference whenever a well-established praxis of relating to some segment of
our world breaks down.
Because of the linear order in which the three possible positions have been
presented one might be tempted to conclude that a hidden dialectic is at work
here. But, taking contextuality seriously, it is impossible to come up with gen-
eral rules that could determine such a process. It is often difficult to decide
whether the successful use of a sign should be seen as a matter of instinct or
training. Naturalistic reduction of semantics and its assimilation to pragmatics
are difficult to distinguish once the representational point of view is bracketed.
First nature fuses with second nature as signs turn into one feature of a uni-
versal, vaguely causal framework. I do not posess an a priori profram telling
me in advance which option has to be taken. At this point the meta-theoretical
problem looms large. Which picture should guide us in deciding the basic shape
investigations about meaning should take? Or can we opt for a variety of pic-
tures? Would this simply amount to giving in to relativism?
Obviously one cannot start a promising research project on the meta-level.
But occasionally it is helpful to take a step back and review the overall situa-
tion. My proposal is to treat the semantical stance as an irreducible stage in
the process I have been indicating. The existence of such processes cannot be
demonstrated to a hypothetical outsider without getting him or her to agree
upon some suitable ontological frame, but this dilemma is common to all the
approaches mentioned. How, then, can the various stages be combined into one
picture, keeping in mind that they follow entirely different descriptive patterns?
Basically, I think, by granting that developments of any kind (think of the arrival
of high fidelity) involve internally coordinated switches of perspective. There
is no Hegelian Logic of History, but there are all kinds of expectations disap-
pointed and fulfilled. Only by keeping the descriptive apparatus flexible justice
can be done to them. It is neither entirely by chance nor by systematic a priori
correlation within a singular pattern that a gestalt-switch can take place. On
such occasions two patterns can profitably be employed simultaneously in an ad
hoc fashion that is nevertheless born out by some set of data. (An underlying
sensory stimulation has for example been arranged to give rise to entirely dif-
ferent interpretations.) Multiple readings of such information are not arbitrary
even though they contain an amount of conventionalized subjective experience.
In fact we are perfectly accustomed to live with simultaneous, mutually exclu-
sive meanings; architects using elevators as decorative elements and children
regarding toys as friends are just two examples. Considering a sign as causal
factor, bearer of meaning and as a social construct is no more mysterious than
regarding a sweater as protection against cold weather, as a gift and as a symbol
of a certain life-style.
A signpost, as Wittgenstein describes it, sometimes leaves doubts regarding
the direction in which it points, but sometimes it does not. This remark does
not sound very profound, yet in an inauspicious way it contains all the problems
about fulfillment I have been discussing. There is no guarantee that doubts will
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not turn the seemingly automatic process of following a direction into an open
question. Conversely, in terms of the resulting question, there is no explanation
of how it is eventually settled. Instinctively we want a theory covering both the
reliability of well-established procedures and their potential to go awry. One
way to respond to this challenge is to take signs as causal instruments and
explain their failing statistically, introducing additional parameters where ever
needed to assimilate them to more conventional scientific mechanisms. This
paper has defended another methodological option: regarding signs as some-
thing that can mislead in the sense of incorporating possible doubt about their
particular function into their definition. The plasticity of signs emphasized by
semantic theory derives from disentangling second from first nature, setting up
and bridging the gap between them. Signs carry expectations, expectations risk
disappointment, possible disappointment can be built into understanding. Na-
ture will never again be what she seemed before she was recognized as partly
man-made. Discussions surrounding semantical concepts are determined by this
hidden fact. Bringing it into the open amounts to turning this lack of reliability
into an asset of language-using animals.
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